Traditionally having a child has been
associated with hope, continuity and the expectation that the next generation
will inherit a world offering opportunities for a better life. Presently
however, for an increasing number of young people, parenthood has become
entangled with a different question: is it ethically and materially defensible
to bring a child into an increasingly unstable climate and consequent crisis? This
question is no longer confined to environmental activists or philosophical
discussions about human population, rather it has become a subject of empirical
research in psychology, sociology, public health and demography as well.
Correspondingly, a landmark international
survey of 10,000 young people aged 16–25 across ten countries, including India,
found that 59% were very or extremely worried about climate change, while 45%
reported that their feelings negatively affected their daily lives and functioning.
Moreover, 75% believed that the future was frightening (Hickman et al., 2021).
These findings reveal the psychological significance of climate change for
young people, although they do not establish that climate anxiety necessarily
translates into fewer births. This distinction matters, because worrying about
climate change, postponing parenthood, preferring a smaller family and
permanently rejecting biological parenthood are different outcomes, and should
not be treated as interchangeable evidence of a demographic transformations.
Nevertheless, the underlying sociological problem is consequential since reproductive decisions are still made through expectations about employment, housing, family relationships, gender roles, health and the future, while climate change potentially alters each one of these expectations. The emerging question, therefore, is not simply whether young people fear environmental catastrophe. It is whether ecological uncertainty is beginning to reshape the social conditions under which parenthood becomes desirable, affordable and morally imaginable.
Eco-grief, climate anxiety and the sociology of reproductive choice
Eco-grief refers to distress associated with environmental loss, including the deterioration of landscapes, ecosystems, species and familiar ways of life, while climate anxiety is a broader expression of apprehension about climate-related threats, their anticipated consequences and the perceived inadequacy of collective responses. Neither of the concepts should automatically be treated as a psychiatric disorder. Anxiety can be a proportionate response to a genuine threat and ecological grief can equally express attachment to a place, a community or a threatened way of life.
These emotional responses become sociologically significant when they influence expectations about the life course since, transition to parenthood depends partly on how individuals imagine the world in which their children will live. If the future is perceived as environmentally dangerous, politically unresponsive or economically precarious, the anticipated costs of raising children may rise even before an individual experiences a direct climate disaster.
A systematic review by Dillarstone, Brown and Flores (2023) screened 446 documents and included 13 studies examining the relationship between climate change, mental health and reproductive decision-making. These studies generally associated climate concerns with less positive reproductive attitudes and intentions to have fewer children or none. Altogether, four recurring explanations emerged: uncertainty about an unborn child's future, environmental concerns about population and consumption, the capacity to meet family subsistence needs, and political or environmental values. The review also stressed that much of the evidence came from high-income countries, limiting generalisation to other settings however, it suggests that reproductive decisions can become a form of anticipatory adaptation: individuals adjust present choices in response to perceived future risks.
What the evidence tells us: Climate distress, fertility intentions and demographic change
As aforementioned, the international survey by Hickman et al. (2021) provides an important starting point. Among 10,000 young people aged 16–25 across ten countries, 59% were very or extremely worried about climate change, 84% were at least moderately worried, 45% reported an adverse effect on daily life and functioning, and 75% agreed that the future was frightening.
|
Indicator |
Finding |
Interpretation and limitation |
|
Very/extremely worried about climate change |
59% |
Among 10,000 respondents aged 16–25 across
ten countries; not a global population estimate. |
|
At least moderately worried |
84% |
Captures a broad level of concern, not
necessarily clinically significant anxiety. |
|
Daily life/functioning negatively affected |
45% |
Self-reported impact in a cross-sectional
survey. |
|
Agreed that the future was frightening |
75% |
Measures perceived future uncertainty, not
fertility behaviour. |
These figures demonstrate the reach of climate-related distress within the surveyed population and indicate that anxiety is connected to broader expectations about social continuity and the future.
A second line of evidence examines reproductive preferences more directly. In a 2024 experiment, Sara Bisi, Nadia Sturm and Jan Van Bavel studied 431 university students: 262 in Belgium and 169 in Italy. Participants were exposed to either a pessimistic climate-change scenario, a more optimistic scenario or a control condition before reporting their fertility desires. Exposure to the pessimistic scenario increased the likelihood of reporting low fertility desire in both countries, while the more optimistic scenario produced a more favourable response among Belgian participants, however, the Italian participants showed effects similar to those exposed to the pessimistic scenario (Bisi et al., 2024).
|
Study / sample |
Main finding |
What it can establish |
|
Bisi, Sturm & Van Bavel (2024); 431
university students in Belgium and Italy |
Pessimistic climate scenarios increased low
stated fertility desire in both samples. |
Experimental evidence about short-term
stated preferences; not actual births or long-term fertility. |
|
Özkan et al. (2025); 491 women at a family
health centre in Türkiye |
Weak negative correlation between
ecological anxiety and childbearing attitudes (r = −0.124; p = 0.006). |
Association in a specific sample; cannot
establish causation or broad representativeness. |
|
Hickman et al. (2021); 10,000 young people
in ten countries |
High reported climate concern and distress. |
Evidence about climate anxiety; not a
direct measure of subsequent fertility outcomes. |
These evidences strengthen the argument that climate-related information can influence short-term fertility preferences. Because the researchers manipulated the scenario presented to participants, the study offers more direct evidence of an immediate effect than a survey that merely measures climate concern and reproductive intention.
Another study (Ozkan et al., 2025) examined 491 women aged 18–49 registered at a family health centre in Turkiye. The researchers found a weak negative correlation between scores measuring ecological anxiety and attitudes towards fertility and childbearing: r = −0.124, with p = 0.006. The correlation indicates that higher ecological anxiety was associated with less favourable childbearing attitudes in this sample, but the association was weak. It cannot establish that ecological anxiety caused those attitudes, and the sample does not represent all women in Turkey, let alone women globally.
Altogether, these studies suggest that climate anxiety can matter for reproductive preferences, nonetheless, they do not establish the magnitude of its contribution to population-level fertility decline.
Global fertility decline is real, but its causes are multiple
The demographic context is important to consider here as according to the United Nations' World Population Prospects 2024, the global total fertility rate fell from approximately 3.31 live births per woman in 1990 to 2.25 in 2024. More than half of countries and areas had fertility below the approximate replacement level of 2.1 births per woman (United Nations, 2024).
|
Year |
Global total fertility rate |
Meaning |
|
1990 |
3.31 births per woman |
Higher average period fertility than in
2024. |
|
2024 |
2.25 births per woman |
About 1.06 fewer births per woman than in
1990. |
|
Change |
−1.06 births per woman (about −32%) |
Describes change in the global period
fertility rate; not completed family size. |
Figure 1. Global total fertility rate
estimates for 1990 and 2024. Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects
2024.
This decline amounts to 1.06 births per woman, or approximately 32% relative to the 1990 level and have been associated with urbanisation, education, access to contraception, declining child mortality, changing family structures, women's employment, later marriage and shifts in the costs and expectations of parenthood. Of late, climate anxiety may have become part of this landscape, but it cannot be isolated as the sole cause of a trend that began long before contemporary eco-anxiety became prominent in public discussions.
Demographic change and the weakening promise of progress
Sociologically speaking, Ulrich Beck's concept of the risk society describes this scenario as he says that modern world is increasingly organised around the production, distribution and management of risks generated by industrial and technological development (Beck, 1992). Economic systems that have generated prosperity have also produced environmental consequences that threaten the conditions sustaining that prosperity and for young adults, the contradiction is particularly acute: they inherit institutions that promise progress while simultaneously confronting evidence that the material foundations of progress are unstable. Therefore, reproductive hesitation is not merely an individual emotional reaction, rather it may be interpreted as a response to the perceived failure of modern institutions to guarantee the security they claim to provide.
To somewhat similarly, Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of habitus help explain that reproductive intentions emerge within socially formed dispositions through which people assess what is possible, desirable and appropriate. These dispositions are shaped by family backgrounds, educational trajectories, economic resources and experiences of social mobility (Bourdieu, 1984). A young adult raised in a household where economic stability was relatively secure may imagine parenthood differently from someone who has experienced repeated financial insecurity. Climate change enters these expectations through existing dispositions and resources shaping individual responses and may therefore reveal a broader crisis of social reproduction: the difficulty of maintaining secure and dignified family life under conditions of environmental instability, economic pressure and inadequate public support.
Final Thoughts: Is climate anxiety really changing fertility behaviour?
The argument that climate anxiety affects reproductive intentions must confront at least three significant objections. First, economic insecurity may be a more powerful explanation, because housing costs, insecure employment, childcare expenses and uncertainty about future earnings can delay family formation even among people who are not especially concerned about climate change. Therefore, climate anxiety may sometimes provide an additional justification for a decision already shaped by material constraints.
Secondly, intentions do not necessarily predict completed fertility. A young person who currently says they do not want children may revise that preference after entering a stable relationship, securing employment or observing changes in public policy. Conversely, someone who strongly desires children may ultimately have fewer than intended because of infertility, financial difficulties or other circumstances.
Thirdly, demographic decline cannot be interpreted as a universal rejection of parenthood. Fertility transitions occur alongside urbanisation, declining child mortality, changing gender roles, increased education and wider access to reproductive healthcare. These processes have different histories and consequences across countries.
A related objection concerns population ethics. Some argue that choosing not to have children for environmental reasons overstates the effect of individual reproductive decisions and understates the importance of consumption patterns, energy systems and corporate emissions. Others argue that concerns about future generations are ethically legitimate regardless of whether an individual's decision has a measurable effect on global emissions.
Both positions identify real issues. The first highlights the danger of transferring responsibility for structural problems onto private households. The second recognises that reproductive decisions can involve legitimate concerns about the welfare of future children.
The evidence therefore supports neither the claim that climate anxiety is irrelevant to fertility nor the claim that it explains a global demographic crisis. The strongest conclusion is more qualified: climate concerns can influence fertility intentions for some people, but the scale, duration and demographic consequences of that influence remain insufficiently established.
References
- Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage Publications. https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/risk-society/book203184
- Bisi, S., Sturm, N., & Van Bavel, J. (2024). Climate change and fertility desires: An experimental study among university students in Belgium and Italy. Demographic Research, 51, Article 2, 17–48. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2024.51.2
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Harvard University Press. https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674212770
- Dillarstone, H., Brown, L. J., & Flores, E. C. (2023). Climate change, mental health, and reproductive decision-making: A systematic review. PLOS Climate, 2(11), e0000236. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pclm.0000236
- Hickman, C., Marks, E., Pihkala, P., Clayton, S., Lewandowski, R. E., Mayall, E. E., Wray, B., Mellor, C., & van Susteren, L. (2021). Climate anxiety in children and young people and their beliefs about government responses to climate change: A global survey. The Lancet Planetary Health, 5(12), e863–e873. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(21)00278-3
- International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) & ICF. (2021). National Family Health Survey (NFHS-5), 2019–21: India. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. https://rchiips.org/nfhs/
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (2022). Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Working Group II contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/
- Ozkan, A., Kolcu, M., Yilmaz, A., & Akbaş, G. (2025). Is ecological anxiety due to climate change associated with the fertility preferences of women? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 31(1), e14265. https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.14265
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2024). World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results. United Nations. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/World-Population-Prospects-2024
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Written by Dr. Bhat, Senior Assistant Professor at the University of Kashmir specializing in Political Sociology and Cultural Politics. Mohammad Aslam Bhat - Google Scholar Related posts: Solo-Living Revolution: Why More People Are Living Alone |

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